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Abstract
Little is known about the drivers and effectiveness of personal as opposed to real loan 
guarantees provided by fi rms. This paper studies a dataset of 477,209 loan contracts 
granted over the 2006-2014 period by one Spanish fi nancial institution consisting of several 
distinguishable organisational units. While personal guarantees are mostly driven by the 
economic environment as refl ected in fi rm and bank conditions, real guarantees are mostly 
explained by loan characteristics. In response to higher capital requirements imposed by 
the European authorities in 2011, personal guarantee requirements increased signifi cantly 
more than their real counterparts. Our results imply that personal guarantees can discipline 
fi rms in their risk-taking, but their overuse can limit this positive effect and damage their 
performance.
Keywords: banks, asymmetric information, real guarantees, personal guarantees, 
risk-taking, capital requirements. 
JEL classifi cation: D43, E32, G21, G32.
Resumen
Poco se sabe todavía sobre los factores que determinan el uso de garantías personales en 
comparación con las garantías reales en el marco de los préstamos bancarios a empresas, 
así como sobre su posterior impacto en la toma de decisiones de las empresas. Este 
trabajo analiza 477.209 contratos de préstamos concedidos durante el período 2006-2014 
por una institución fi nanciera española compuesta por distintas unidades organizativas 
distinguibles a lo largo del tiempo. Mientras que el uso de garantías personales se determina 
principalmente por el entorno económico como refl ejo de las condiciones de la empresa 
y del banco, el uso de las garantías reales se explica mayoritariamente por las características 
del préstamo. Como respuesta a los mayores requerimientos de capital impuestos por las 
autoridades europeas en 2011, el uso de las garantías personales se incrementó de forma 
mucho más acusada que el uso de las garantías reales. Nuestros resultados indican que 
las garantías personales pueden mitigar el riesgo que las empresas están dispuestas a 
asumir, pero su uso excesivo puede limitar este efecto e impactar negativamente sobre la 
rentabilidad de las empresas.
Palabras clave: banca, información asimétrica, garantías reales, garantías personales, 
toma de riesgos, requerimientos de capital.
Códigos JEL: D43, E32, G21, G32.
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1. Introduction 
Why are some bank loans collateralized with personal guarantees while 
other ones employ real assets? What are the specific firm and loan drivers 
behind this decision? Did the recent bank regulation have any impact on the 
guarantees required by banks? If so, what type of guarantee is being 
preferred and why? Do borrowers mitigate their risk and/or enhance their 
profitability due to the usage of a specific type of guarantee? 
These questions lie at the heart of loan contract design, where asymmetric 
information problems remain pervasive (see the original theoretical 
contribution by Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981).1 But in addition to their purpose 
of reducing adverse selection and moral hazard problems, banks actively 
manage collateral to mitigate risk and to improve regulatory capital ratios. 
As policy makers and regulators strive to reconcile financial stability with 
economic growth, an understanding of the trade-offs embedded in the use of 
a specific type of guarantee is of utmost importance for all economic agents. 
In this paper, we try to shed some light on all these questions through an 
empirical investigation. 
Guarantees can take the form of personal or real guarantees. Personal 
guarantees entail the direct and joint liability of new guarantors, these 
being persons (e.g., firm’s managers or third persons to the firm) or 
institutions (e.g., official institutions or mutual guarantees societies) whose 
solvency is sufficiently demonstrated as to ensure the full loan repayment in 
case of the borrower’s default. In contrast, real guarantees simply refer to 
specific assets, such as real estate, financial or movable assets, that the 
lender can subsequently sell in the case of borrower’s default. 
                                                            
1 The theoretical literature illustrates that posting collateral protects against the two 
traditional types of asymmetric information, i.e., adverse selection (Bester, 1985; Besanko 
and Thakor, 1987) and moral hazard (Boot, Thakor, Udell, 1991). Empirical studies have 
widely confirmed the important role of reducing adverse selection and moral hazard as key 
drivers behind collateral use (e.g., Cole, Goldberg, White, 2002; Berger, Espinosa-Vega, 
Frame, Miller, 2011; and Bellucci, Borisov, Giombini, and Zazzaro, 2015). 
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Figure 1 depicts the evolution of personal and real guarantee requirements 
by a Spanish financial institution and its subsidiaries from 2006 to 2014. 
The first feature is that both the number and amount of loans without 
explicit guarantees significantly decrease over time. The second feature is 
the remarkable difference in terms of the use of personal and real 
guarantees. While, the amount collateralized through personal guarantees 
displays a significant increase, particularly after the second semester of 
2011, the one corresponding through real guarantees remains stable. This 
increase in the use of personal guarantees is in agreement with the evidence 
illustrated in the survey conducted by the Spanish Chamber of Commerce 
about the SME access to finance.2 
Figure 1: Evolution of the requirements of real and personal guarantees
Figure 1 depicts the evolution of the requirements of real and personal guarantees by a
Spanish financial institution and its subsidiaries from 2006 to 2014. The first panel
summarizes the evolution in terms of the proportion of loans with guarantees whereas
the second panel summarizes the evolution of the amount collateralized through the
two types of guarantees.
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What explains the increasing requirements of guarantees and the recent 
preference towards personal guarantees? The increase of collateralized 
                                                            
2 http://www.guitrans.eus/documentos/B_812_DOC2.pdf (in Spanish). 
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loans (no matter the guarantee type) is related, on the one hand, to the need 
to mitigate the credit risk in a context of uncertainty and weak global 
economic conditions. On the other hand, guarantees play a key role in 
capital regulation in which the assets weighted by their risk level are 
fundamental. In addition, there are several potential reasons supporting the 
increasing use of personal guarantees: First, most personal guarantees are 
executed more rapidly and efficiently through extrajudicial enforcement. 
This became particularly important in the crisis period due to the increase 
in the number of opened judicial process to foreclose real guarantees. 
Second, firms that had prior loans with the bank may be lacking real 
collateral (real estate or financial assets). Third, since real estate is the most 
frequent real guarantee, in case of execution, the bank’s exposure to the real 
estate sector and the higher provisions implied could substantially increase. 
Finally, from a capital regulatory perspective, personal and real guarantees 
can be used to reduce the risk weighted assets (RWA) as long as they fulfill 
certain specified conditions. However, it is important to have in mind that 
for personal guarantees, the loan is guaranteed with the present and future 
wealth of the guarantor, and this could generate uncertainty, mainly in the 
medium- and long-run. 
The empirical literature so far has mainly focused on the determinants of 
the use of real guarantees or collateral (e.g., Jiménez, Salas, and Saurina, 
2006; Berger, Frame and Ioannidou, 2011). Yet, because of data limitations, 
little is still known about the determinants of personal guarantees usage 
and in general, about the differences between personal and real guarantees. 
In this paper, we break new ground by examining the determinants behind 
the requirement of personal and real guarantees, their use to improve the 
bank loan portfolio credit risk and capital ratios, and the costs and benefits 
for the firm. To address these questions, we use a unique and proprietary 
dataset of 477,209 loan contracts granted over the 2006-2014 period by a 
Spanish financial institution and its subsidiaries. 
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Our results show that personal guarantees are mostly driven by the 
economic environment as reflected in firm and bank conditions, whereas 
real guarantees are mostly explained by loan characteristics. The 
requirement of personal and real guarantees also differs along several other 
important dimensions. For instance, personal guarantees are typically 
employed in short and medium-term loans, whereas real collateral is 
increasingly prevalent at longer maturities. We also find that a higher loan 
amount increases the likelihood of using real collateral significantly more 
than personal guarantees. Thus, long-term large loans typically involve real 
guarantees, as it may be harder for firm managers to collateralize these 
loans with their net worth, because this tends to be more uncertain than the 
value of real assets. We also find that real collateral requirements are more 
likely for larger firms but less likely for more leveraged firm. Additionally, 
the distance between branch and bank headquarters increases the 
probability of pledging real or personal guarantees almost equally. 
After characterizing the drivers of personal and real guarantees, we analyze 
the sizeable increase in the use of guarantees, especially the personal ones, 
after October 2011 (see Figure 2). The widespread use of personal 
guarantees after the previous date is the result of two coinciding events. 
First, the recommendations and measures following the July 2011 stress 
test results to improve capital ratios, in conjunction with the weak economic 
conditions, pushed the bank to enhance their loans’ default and loss rates, 
which are key components of the credit risk analysis carried out under 
stress tests. In this respect, the use of guarantees can be seen as a way of 
aligning the bank and SMEs objectives (Aghion and Bolton, 1992; La Porta, 
López de Silanes, Sheleifer and Vishny, 1998) and, as a consequence, banks 
can reduce the loan default rates and the associated losses in case of final 
default. Second, in October 2011, the EU reached an agreement whereby 
European banks should increase their capital buffers by the summer of 2012 
to improve the resilience of the banking system. This period is characterized 
by capital scarcity and thus, banks may display an incentive to minimize 
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the cost of this new requirement through an extensive use of guarantees. To 
understand the effectiveness of guarantees to improve the capital ratio, it is 
important to highlight that at that date the bank had adopted the advanced 
Internal Ratings Based (IRB) approach for its corporate and retail 
exposures. Under this system, there are no limits to the range of eligible 
guarantors. In addition, if the creditworthiness of the guarantor is 
sufficiently qualified to ensure the reimbursement of the principal and to 
provide a high enough coverage ratio, personal guarantees can be used to 
reduce the RWA. In sum, the mitigation of credit risk and the optimization 
of RWA together with the previously enumerated advantages of personal 
guarantees, can explain why this type of guarantee became so popular.  
Figure 2: Evolution of the requirements of real and personal 
guarantees around October 2011
Figure 4 depicts the evolution of the requirements of real and personal guarantees by
a Spanish financial institution and its subsidiaries around October 2011. The first
panel summarizes the evolution in terms of the proportion of loans with guarantees
whereas the second panel summarizes the evolution of the amount collateralized
through the two types of guarantees.
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and performance. In fact, we find that prior to October 2011 firms reduced 
their risk after being granted loans with personal guarantees. As personal 
guarantees often involve managers’ net worth, they internalize potential 
losses thereby increasing their risk aversion towards investments and 
management in general to a higher extent than real guarantees. However, 
the overuse of personal guarantees after October 2011 could limit their 
effectiveness and could prevent some managers to invest in certain projects, 
thus affecting the efficiency of their investment decisions. The overuse of 
personal guarantees could, in the end, affect the firm profitability and, as a 
consequence, the real economy. 
Even though personal and real guarantees have very different properties, 
only a handful of recent papers treat them separately.3 Brick and Palia 
(2007) and Calcagnini, Farabullini and Giombini (2014) for example explore 
the differential effects of personal versus real collateral on the loan rate, 
while Pozzolo (2004), Voordeckers and Steijvers (2006), and Ono and Uesugi 
(2009) ?? ????? ???? ?????? ? study their differential determinants. The first 
paper studies 52,000 bank credit lines that were granted in Italy between 
1992 and 1996, and finds differences along relationship characteristics and 
firm risk in collateralization outcomes. The second paper studies a sample of 
234 credit files in a large Belgian bank between 2000 and 2003, while the 
third paper accesses a 2002 Survey of the Financial Environment which 
covers 1,700 Japanese firms to investigate both the determinants of the use 
of personal/real guarantees and the relation between collateral usage and 
monitoring efforts by lenders. 
The widespread usage of guarantees, which is not linked to solve 
asymmetric information problems but to accommodate capital requirements, 
could ultimately affect bank borrowers along two dimensions: Risk-taking 
                                                            
3 Udell (2015) makes a related point about outside (assets provided by someone outside the 
firm) versus inside (assets pledged by the firm) collateral. Recent papers focus on how 
changes in the law that facilitate real collateralization leads to an increase in borrowing 
and performance of firms (e.g., Calomiris, Larrain, Liberti, and Sturgess, 2015; Campello 
and Larrain, 2015; Cerqueiro, Ongena, Roszbach, 2016 a,b). 
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the differential effects of these drivers on the probability of requiring either 
personal or real guarantees. In addition, we analyze how the bank and its 
subsidiaries modify their guarantee policy to improve credit risk 
management and fulfill stricter capital requirement and how the type of 
guarantee affects firm risk-taking and profitability. This comprehensive 
analysis is only made possible thanks to the uniquely large and detailed 
data set we have access to. 
Our results highlight the policy trade-offs faced by macro prudential 
regulation aiming at increasing the resilience of the banking system. On the 
one hand, banks can improve their loan portfolio’s credit risk and their 
RWAs by resorting to the use of personal guarantees and this could 
contribute to improve the overall financial stability. On the other hand, the 
surge in the use of personal guarantees following October 2011 was not 
effective in enhancing the risk and profitability profile of new borrowers. So, 
this new pattern does not necessarily achieve the primary objective of 
mitigating credit risk and could even have a negative effect on the real 
economy. 
The remainder of paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the main 
features of our dataset. Section 3 explains the hypotheses formally tested in 
the paper. Section 4 shows and explains the empirical findings on the firm 
and loan characteristics that explain the use of personal or real guarantees. 
Section 5 provides evidence on the relation between guarantee policies and 
capital-adequacy bank management after 2011. Section 6 shows evidence on 
the relationships between the use of guarantees and the firm’s risk and 
performance. Section 7 concludes. 
2. Dataset 
Our proprietary dataset comes from a Spanish financial corporation and its 
subsidiaries. It contains information on 477,209 loans granted between 
In contrast to these three studies, we assess many more possible drivers of 
personal and real collateralization, i.e., bank, loan, bank-firm, and firm 
characteristics, and distinguish across different time periods. We identify 
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a guarantee and the amount covered by the guarantee relative to the loan 
size. Information on guarantees includes the type of guarantee, either 
personal or real. In addition, our dataset contains the variables detailed 
below: 
Firm characteristics: 
February 2006 and November 2014. Besides the standard loan 
characteristics, the dataset contains information on the existence (or not) of 
? Total Assets: Logarithm of firm total assets in Euros. 
? Financial Leverage: Ratio of firm total assets to stockholder’s equity.  
? ROA: Firm return on assets. 
? Refinancing: Dummy that equals one when the firm is refinanced, 
and equals zero otherwise. 
Bank4-Firm characteristic: 
? Any Other Type of Contract: Dummy that equals one if the firm has 
other type of outstanding contracts with the bank (i.e., credit cards, 
credit lines, or other loans) when the loan is granted, and equals zero 
otherwise. 
Bank characteristics: 
? Branch-Headquarter Distance (organizational distance): Distance 
between the bank branch and the headquarters, measured in either 
the logarithm of kilometers or minutes.5 
Loan characteristics: 
                                                            
4 We use the term bank hereafter to refer to the parent bank and its subsidiaries given that 
they belong to the same organizational unit. 
5 Other papers study the effect of the physical distance (i.e., distance between the borrower 
and lender) on the use of guarantees. For instance, Bellucci, Borisov, Giombini, and Zazzaro 
(2015) find that more distant borrowers from the branch experience higher collateral 
requirements. We focus on organizational distance because the loans in our bank are 
decided at different hierarchical levels. Large loans granted to large firms are formalized in 
the main office in the province, region, or even in the bank national headquarters when the 
size of the loan/firm is high. Thus, a measure of physical distance to the deciding branch 
does not only reflect the real proximity but also the characteristics of the firm and loan size. 
? Loan Maturity: Logarithm of the loan maturity in months at 
origination. 
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? Size: Logarithm of the loan amount in Euros. 
We assess how representative our sample is in terms of its geographical 
distribution and the frequencies of various business activities. We first map 
firm location (by zip code) to both bank branch and headquarter locations. 
There are 5,117 zip codes and 3,200 municipalities where firms obtain loans 
(see Panel A of Table 1) and 1,088 municipalities with bank branches. Zip 
codes with firms in our dataset represent almost half of all the zip codes in 
Spain (i.e., 46 percent), while the branch zip codes represent almost three 
quarters (i.e., 71 percent) of all the zip codes in towns with more than 10,000 
inhabitants. As shown in Panel B, the distribution of loans varies 
significantly across zip codes and municipalities. Panel C of Table 1 
classifies firms by sector and size.6 In comparison to the Spanish business 
activity, our sample overweights (underweights) the industry (services) 
sector, whereas in terms of the firm’s size, our sample of SMEs is similar to 
the country average. 
Panel A of Table 2 contains descriptive statistics on the contract 
characteristics. The average loan maturity is higher than one year (i.e., 
18.42 months) but there are a considerable number of short-term loans, as 
the median maturity (3.95 months) reveals. Contrary to Jiménez, Salas, and 
Saurina (2006), who use loans with a maturity higher than one year and 
split the sample in two groups depending on the loan maturity (1-3 years 
and more than 3 years), we consider all the loans in the sample after 
treating potential rollovers.7 The average loan size is around 100,000€ but it 
                                                            
6 The thresholds applied in the size classification correspond to the European Commission 
Recommendation 2003/361/EC of 6 May 2003. Due to the lack of information relative to the 
number of employees, the classification of firms in our sample is based on total assets. 
Statistics relative to the Spanish business activity by sector and size come from the 
Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE). 
7 A rollover loan is defined as one with less-than-1-year maturity, granted immediately 
after another short-run loan matures (next day), with the same amount, maturity and 
contracted in the same bank office than a previous loan. In an exercise available in the 
Internet Appendix, we examine whether this strategy to detect rollovers affects the results 
by analyzing loans with more-than-1-year maturity and find that it does not. 
B
A
N
C
O
 D
E
 E
S
P
A
Ñ
A
16
D
O
C
U
M
E
N
T
O
 D
E
 T
R
A
B
A
JO
 N
.º 1715 Panel A
Units Total
No. ZIP codes with firms - 5,117
No. ZIP codes with branches - 1,662
No. ZIP codes with firms/No. ZIP codes (in the Country) % 45.63
No. ZIP codes > 10,000 inh. with branches/No. ZIP codes > 10,000 inh. (in the Country) % 71.02
No. municipalities with firms - 3,200
No. municipalities with branches - 1,088
No. municipalities with firms/No. municipalities (in the Country) % 39.41
No. muni. > 10,000 inh. with branches/No. muni. > 10,000 inh. (in the Country) % 65.80
Panel B
Units Mean SD Median Min Max
No. received loans by ZIP code 000 0.35 0.52 0.13 0.00 5.19
No. granted loans by ZIP code 000 0.81 1.08 0.40 0.00 6.03
No. of received loans by municipality 000 1.76 6.00 0.24 0.00 33.42
No. of granted loans by municipality 000 4.23 11.11 0.61 0.00 47.33
No. of firms receiving loans by municipality 000 0.21 0.74 0.03 0.00 4.67
Panel C
Sample Spain Sample Spain
Construction 19.02% 15.19% SME 97.76% 99.84%
Industry 25.28% 6.86% Large 2.24% 0.16%
Services 26.34% 53.78%
Trade 29.37% 24.17%
By Size
Table 1: Descriptive statistics on the loan representativeness at zip code and municipality level, sector and size 
Panel A of Table 1 contains information on the number (No.) of zip codes and municipalities (muni.) with firms and bank branches in our
sample, which spans from February 2006 to September 2014, joint with its representativeness over the whole country. Panel B of Table 1
contains descriptive statistics (mean, standard deviation, median, minimum, and maximum) of the loan activity by zip code and
municipality. Panel C of Table 1 reports the firms in sample by sector and size and the comparable statistics to the whole economy. Inh.:
inhabitants. 
By Sector
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varies substantially, ranging from 550€ to 3,000,000€, showing the wide 
heterogeneity of firms and loan types in the sample. 
Panel B of Table 2 contains descriptive statistics on the use of guarantees 
and their characteristics. Personal guarantees are more often used than real 
guarantees in our sample. While 35 percent of the loans include a personal 
guarantee, only 8 percent of them have a real guarantee.8 In terms of real 
guarantees, the most common ones are mortgages. As Panel B shows, the 
average coverage of personal guarantees relative to loan size is 163 
percent.9 For those loans with real guarantees, mortgage guarantees cover, 
on average, almost 100 percent of the loan size, while financial asset-based 
guarantees cover a much lower percentage of the loan size (61 percent, on 
average). 
Descriptive statistics on firm characteristics are shown in Table 2, Panel C. 
The median firm obtains 2 loans from the bank during the 2006-2014 
sample period, ranging between 1 and 2,419. The median firm has total 
assets of 2.07 million euros, a financial leverage ratio equal to 3.85, and a 
ROA of 0.46 percent. Additionally, the dataset contains information on 
whether loans are granted to previously refinanced firms (27 percent of all 
the sample loans). Our dataset contains information on all the other bank-
firm contracts. We observe that 30 percent of the firms had other types of 
contracts with the bank (i.e., credit cards, credit lines, or other loans) when 
the loan was granted. This variable is used as a proxy for relationship 
lending, due to the implied effect of diminishing informational asymmetries. 
The organizational distance ? both physical and in terms of traveling time ? 
between bank branch and headquarters is relatively large, pointing towards 
a relevant source of asymmetric information. This reflects the distance 
between the different provinces in Spain and the financial center, located in 
                                                            
8 Among the personal guarantees, the wide majority of them are associated to the firm itself 
(e.g., firm’s managers). The ones associated with other institutions are much less frequent 
and represent around 1% of personal guarantees. 
9 The coverage ratio is obtained as the proportion of the loan size that is hedged by the 
guarantee associated with that risk.
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Madrid. The maximum distance (above 2,589 km) is due to the fact that the 
Canary Islands are far away from the Iberian Peninsula. 
Panel A Units Mean SD Median Min Max
Loan Maturity Months 18.42 35 3.95 0.69 225.8
Loan Size 000 Euro 104.16 303.91 27.57 0.55 3,000.00
Panel B Units Mean SD Median Min Max
Personal Guarantees  0/1 0.35 0.48 0 0 1
Real Guarantees  0/1 0.08 0.28 0 0 1
Real Guarantees - Mortgage  0/1 0.07 0.25 0 0 1
Real Guarantees - Financial assets  0/1 0.02 0.13 0 0 1
Real & Personal Guarantees  0/1 0.03 0.17 0 0 1
Personal Guarantees Coverage % 163.29 94.58 100.00 0.01 1,300.00
Real Guarantees Coverage % 94.71 28.56 100.00 0.01 411.06
Real Guarantees - Financial Assets Coverage % 60.68 41.90 57.67 0.01 411.06
Real Guarantees - Mortgage Coverage % 98.73 20.03 100.00 0.09 393.43
Panel C Units Mean SD Median Min Max
No. Loans - 7.48 31.09 2 1 2,419
Total Assets 000,000 Euro 5.69 11.28 2.07 0.32 93.6
Leverage - 9.58 30.31 3.85 -79.58 239.9
ROA % -0.82 8.7 0.46 -61.58 21.7
Refinancing  0/1 0.27 0.44 0 0 1
Any Other Type of Contract  0/1 0.3 0.46 0 0 1
Branch-Headquarter Distance Kilometers 433.83 366.34 416.02 0.00 2,589.55  
Branch-Headquarter Distance Time Minutes 334.99 610.53 246.92 0.00 4,601.73  
Table 2: Descriptive statistics on firm and loan characteristics
Panel A of Table 2 contains descriptive statistics (mean, standard deviation, median, minimum,
and maximum) on the contract characteristics. Panel B of Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics
on the use of guarantees and their coverage ratios. Guarantee’s information refers to the use of
personal and real guarantees and each subtype of guarantees: personal guarantees provided by the
firm or by other institutions and real guarantees in the form of mortgage or financial assets. Panel
C of Table contains the descriptive statistics on several firm characteristics: number of loans
granted, balance-sheet related characteristics (total assets, leverage, and ROA), the use of
refinancing, the use of other type contracts (including other loans) with the bank when the loan
was granted and the distance between the branch granting loan and the bank headquarters. 
Table 3 shows the correlation among the dependent and explanatory 
variables. Correlations among explanatory variables are overall quite small, 
except the high positive correlation (50 percent) between the size of the loan 
and the maturity. Regarding the unconditional correlations between 
explanatory variables and guarantee dummies, a higher organizational 
distance is associated with a higher likelihood of posting personal and real 
guarantees. We also observe that loans with higher size and higher 
maturity are positively correlated with the likelihood of having personal and 
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real guarantees. In contrast, having other types of contracts is negatively 
related to having guarantees. At the firm level, higher leverage, being 
previously refinanced, lower total assets, and a smaller ROA all imply a 
higher likelihood of having to post personal and real guarantees. 
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Units [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11]
[1] Personal Guarantees 0/1
[2] Real Guarantees 0/1 0.00
[3] Personal Guarantees Coverage % 0.81 -0.03
[4] Real Guarantees Coverage % -0.02 0.95 -0.04
[5] Branch-Headquarter Distance log 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02
[6] Loan Maturity log months 0.22 0.44 0.06 0.43 -0.02
[7] Loan Size log 0.08 0.32 -0.03 0.31 -0.05 0.50
[8] Any Other Type of Contract 0/1 -0.19 -0.15 -0.14 -0.15 0.02 -0.29 -0.13
[9] Total Assets log Eur -0.17 -0.01 -0.15 -0.01 -0.02 -0.13 0.25 0.16
[10] Leverage - 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.05 -0.02 0.04 0.03 -0.03 -0.01
[11] ROA % -0.02 -0.07 0.00 -0.07 0.02 -0.05 -0.01 0.10 0.02 0.00
[12] Refinancing 0/1 0.07 0.14 0.06 0.14 -0.03 0.04 0.01 -0.03 0.05 0.18 -0.02
This table contains the matrix of correlation among the dependent and explanatory variables. The first four variables represent the
dependent variables. Variables [1] – [2] are dummy variables that take value one if the loan has personal and real guarantees,
respectively. Variables [3] – [4] represent the coverage ratio of the personal and real guarantees, respectively. Variables [5] – [12] are
the set of explanatory variables and are self-descriptive.
Table 3: Correlations among the dependent and explanatory variables
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3. Research Hypotheses 
We explore three loan/firm dimensions that can differentially affect the use 
of personal and real guarantees. The first one is related to loan 
characteristics. As Table 2 reports, our sample consists of loans that range 
from less than one month of maturity to 226 months (almost 19 years). The 
banking literature (see Boot, Thakor, and Udell (1991) among others) 
argues that the longer the maturity, the more likely that the bank will 
request collateral to align the borrower and the lender incentives. However, 
the impact of maturity on the guarantees use could differ for the two types 
of guarantees. Personal guarantees depend on the firm’s manager’s present 
and future wealth. This can be a disadvantage for the bank especially in the 
case of long term loans, where there is more uncertainty in both the state of 
the economy and the financed project. This uncertainty affects the 
entrepreneur’s wealth, suggesting the use of real instead of personal 
guarantees for long term loans. Thus, we expect personal guarantees to be 
typically employed in short and medium-term loans, where the uncertainty 
on the manager wealth is typically lower. In contrast, real collateral is 
expected to be increasingly prevalent at longer maturities.10 A similar 
argument can be made with loan size: As loans become larger in size, the 
ability of personal guarantees covering a default is more uncertain. Banks 
will thus likely resort to real collateral in the context of sizable loans. In 
addition, the execution of personal guarantees in large loans can damage 
the managers’ ability to pursue further entrepreneurial activities. In the 
context of bank-firm relationships, banks would then prefer not to place this 
extra-weight on companies. 
Secondly, the requirement of personal and real guarantees could differ due 
to the firm credit quality and the overall economic conditions. The 
theoretical literature on moral hazard shows that when lenders observe 
borrowers’ credit quality, low-quality borrowers obtain loans with collateral 
                                                            
10 Indeed the data confirm that real guarantees are more prevalent for loans with maturity 
higher than 10 years, whereas personal guarantees are very common in short and medium-
term loans. 
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and high-quality borrowers obtain loans without having to pledge collateral 
(Boot, Thakor, and Udell, 1991). By and large, the empirical literature 
confirms these theoretical insights (Jiménez, Salas, and Saurina, 2006). In 
their analysis of credit lines’ collateralization and types of collateral 
employed, Voordeckers and Steijvers (2006) classify personal guarantees as 
the ones offering the highest level of protection. In fact, with personal 
guarantees the lender receives explicit claims on personal assets and/or 
future borrower’s wealth. So, the likelihood of suffering personal losses for 
the borrower is much higher in the presence of personal guarantees, which 
could ultimately affect their risk-taking behavior. For this reason, we expect 
the bank to require personal guarantees when the economic conditions of 
the firm and/or the overall economy deteriorate. 
The third dimension refers to the role of the bank-firm characteristics and 
concretely, to the distance between them. Banks can take decisions in 
centralized or decentralized ways. In the first case, the bank avoids 
delegation and agency costs. It favors the use of hard information and a 
more formal communication between the headquarters and the branches. 
Decentralized decisions taken at the branch level imply more autonomy in 
the loan granting process (i.e., assessment, approval, pricing…) and favor 
the use of soft information collected at the branch level. Both approaches 
imply organizational diseconomies (Stein, 2002) in the form of efficiency 
losses compared to the situation where there are no informational 
asymmetries. In our view, these diseconomies can induce headquarters to 
require guarantees based on hard information. For this reason, as the 
distance between the branch and the headquarter increases, the latter 
would be more tempted to prefer real guarantees requirements in loan 
contracts over personal guarantees. 
Hypothesis 1: The use of personal and real guarantees is differently 
affected by several loan/firm dimensions such as the loan maturity and size, 
the firm credit quality, the overall economic conditions and the branch-
headquarter (organizational) distance. 
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The sample period includes two events coinciding with a change in the bank 
guarantee policy. First, the recommendations and measures following the 
July 2011 stress test results, in conjunction with weak economic conditions, 
pushed banks to enhance their loan’s default and loss rates and their 
regulatory capital requirements. After the announcement of the results, the 
national supervisory authorities (NSA) requested banks with a Core Tier 1 
capital ratio below the 5% threshold under the adverse scenario to 
“promptly remedy this situation”. In addition, banks with a ratio above 5% 
but close to the threshold under the adverse scenario “should provide a plan 
for remedial action”. In both cases, the plan had to be provided by mid-
October 2011 and implemented by mid-April 2012. Second, the EU reached 
an agreement that European banks should increase their capital buffers 
setting the minimum Core Tier 1 capital ratio in the 9 percentage. The 
objective of the capital exercise is to create an exceptional and temporary 
capital buffer to address current market concerns over sovereign risk. As a 
result of this measure, many banks (including the one under analysis) had 
to revise their capital policy and take operative measures to improve their 
common equity standards.11  
Both events explain the increasing demand of guarantees since they can be 
seen as the natural instruments to decrease losses and to align the interest 
of creditors and debtors mitigating default rates (see Aghion and Bolton, 
1992; La Porta, López de Silanes, Sheleifer and Vishny, 1998). Moreover, 
effective guarantees (i.e., guarantees that fulfill certain regulatory criteria) 
might contribute to improve the capital ratios by reducing the RWA. In fact, 
the EBA highlights the usefulness of the improvement in collateral and 
guarantees as a mitigating measure to reduce the RWAs.12 In this context, 
                                                            
11 For more information see: 
http://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/26923/Sovereign-capital-
shortfall_Methodology-FINAL.pdf 
12 See detailed information on the impact of the use of guarantees and collateral on the 
reduction of RWA (page 13): 
http://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/15956/Finalreportrecapitalisationexercise.pdf/8
7602d3f-ec8d-4788-9aa8-fae0f28f4c23. 
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the question that arises is whether banks rely on guarantees to achieve 
their goals and whether they prefer the use of personal or real guarantees. 
On the one hand, most loan agreements involving personal guarantees 
represent general claims against the present and future wealth and 
typically do not restrict the use of that wealth by the borrower, while real 
guarantees include restrictions on the use that borrowers can make of the 
assets pledged as a guarantee. Thus, personal guarantees generally 
represent a weaker pledge than real guarantees (Bodenhorn, 2003). In 
addition, the capital reduction based on real guarantees could be higher as 
most of the personal guarantees are not supported by official institutions 
that would minimize to a larger extent the consumption of capital (see Table 
2, Panel B). 
On the other hand, personal guarantees could act as a disciplining device 
that limits the borrower’s risk preference incentives, surpassing that of 
business collateral (Mann, 1997). Moreover, personal guarantees are more 
valuable than real guarantees in case the guarantor’s personal assets can be 
easily valuated or sold compared to certain firm-specific assets or human 
capital (Bodenhorn, 2003). In addition, borrowers that had prior loans with 
the bank may lack real estate or financial assets (real guarantees) to be 
pledged. Another reason supporting the use of personal guarantees relies on 
the potential advantages they offer to the bank in terms of efficiency. 
According to the information available for the period 2012-2014, most of the 
personal guarantees (more than 80 percent) are in the form of póliza de 
afianzamiento mercantil. This specific type of guarantee has a clear 
advantage over other types of guarantees: It can be rapidly and efficiently 
executed through extrajudicial enforcement. Finally, personal guarantees 
could also be of interest for banks to reduce their RWAs. To such aim, the 
creditworthiness of the guarantor should be sufficiently qualified to ensure 
the reimbursement of the principal and should provide a high enough 
coverage ratio. In this respect, Figure 3 shows an increase in the average 
coverage ratio of personal guarantees, supporting the idea that the bank 
could have increased the demand for those guarantees that can be 
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effectively used to reduce their RWAs. Indeed, from 2011 to 2012 the bank 
reduced the RWA applicable to most of the credit risk categories in the 
Advanced IRB corporate portfolio and, although to a lower extent, in the 
retail portfolio. 
Consistently with these arguments, Figure 2 reveals an important bank 
guarantee policy change in October 2011: After that date, guarantees are 
substantially more prevalent, especially in the form of personal guarantees.  
Hypothesis 2: Both personal and real guarantees are used to improve 
loan’s credit risk and regulatory capital requirements, but in our specific 
context personal guarantees are preferred to real guarantees. 
Figure 3: Coverage Ratio around October 2011
Figure 3 reports the average coverage ratio of new loans granted with personal or real
guarantees using a 3-month window before and after October 2011. 
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We next turn to the effects of guarantees on firms’ risk and profitability. A 
common result in the scarce literature analyzing the performance of firms 
engaging in secured loans following collateral granting is that collateralized 
loans exhibit higher default probabilities because borrowers that pledge 
collateral are riskier ex-ante (Jiménez and Saurina, 2004; and Berger et al., 
2011). However, Berger et al. (2016), based on the Bolivian credit registry 
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for the period 1999–2003, show that the effect of collateral on ex-post 
performance could depend on the specific type of collateral. Thus, they find 
that illiquid collateral is consistently associated with higher ex-post non-
performance, whereas the opposite occurs with liquid collateral, which 
supports the idea that liquid collateral has stronger risk-reducing 
incentives.13 A similar positive effect associated to the use of guarantees is 
found by Ono et al. (2012) from a survey that consists of 500 Japanese SMEs 
covering the period 2001-2005. They document that those borrowers 
providing collateral experience larger increases in profitability and 
reductions in riskiness compared to borrowers that do not. This positive 
effect of collateral occurs through a cost-cutting restructuring channel. In 
addition, this paper represents the first attempt to examine how the 
provision of personal and real guarantees affects borrowers’ ex-post 
performance and shows that the positive effect associated with guarantees 
is almost exclusively attributable to the real ones. 
Our setting allows us to analyze in detail the risk and performance profiles 
of firms depending on the lender requirements of either personal or real 
guarantees. From a technical point of view, a personal guarantee leads to 
the transformation in the nature of the firm responsibility. In short, a 
limited responsibility firm becomes an unlimited responsibility firm if a loan 
is backed by personal guarantees. This could lead to a higher managerial 
effort level to avoid losing their pledged personal wealth in case of default. 
For this reason, personal guarantees should in principle reduce the risk-
                                                            
13 Liquid collateral is the one pledged in the form deposits, bank guarantees, or securities while illiquid 
collateral corresponds to the remaining types of collateral.
appetite to a larger extent. In fact the stronger disciplinary effect of 
personal guarantees in the form of higher effort and lower risk taking 
incentives, as stated by Mann (1997), could lead in the end to a better firm 
performance. 
However, the overuse of guarantees, as documented after October 2011 
concerning personal guarantees, could limit their effectiveness. For this 
reason, the requirement to pledge this type of guarantees solely based on 
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capital relief purposes and not to discipline borrowers limiting their risk 
taking could have a negligible effect on their later default risk. After the 
extensive use of this type of guarantees and the substantial increase in their 
coverage ratio, the borrower’s incentives to take any risk could be so low 
that it could discourage firms to undertake certain investments, affecting 
the efficiency of their investment decisions. This would lead to a negative 
effect on firm performance and, as a consequence, on the real economy. 
Hypothesis 3: Personal guarantees are more effective than real guarantees 
to mitigate the firms’ risk but their overuse could limit its effectiveness and 
damage firm performance. 
4. Drivers of Real and Personal Guarantees 
In this section, we first lay out the empirical model we analyze, together 
with the first empirical results. We explain here the role of each different 
driver on the usage of personal guarantees and real collateral. 
4.1.Empirical Framework 
We postulate the following ordinary least squares regression framework,14 
where the existence/absence of personal or real guarantees (1/0) in a given 
loan contract i, denoted as Gi, is regressed on several sets of variables, 
                                                            
14 Although the results obtained with a logistic model are similar to the ones obtained with 
the OLS regression, we opt for the last one because the probabilities that we are modelling 
are not extreme. Under these circumstances, both models fit equally well but the linear 
model is preferred for its ease of interpretation.
including information on the bank, loan, bank-firm and firm characteristics, 
plus sector, bank/subsidiaries,15 year, and province fixed effects: 
? ? = ? + ???? + ???? + ?????,?,? + ????,? + ?? + ?? + ?? + ?? + ?? ( 1 ) 
where Bb, Li, BFb,f.t and Ff,t stand for the bank, loan, bank-firm and firm 
characteristics described in Section 2, respectively. Both bank-firm and firm 
15 The use of subsidiary fixed effects enables us to deal with different organizational 
structures, or business models of each subsidiary. 
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characteristics refer to the month before the loan is granted (t). The 
subscript b denotes the bank/subsidiary granting the loan to firm f 
operating in sector s and located in province p. The subscript y denotes the 
year in which the loan is granted and so, the term ?? refers to the use of 
year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. 
4.2.Results 
Table 4 provides evidence on the effects of bank, loan, bank-firm and firm 
characteristics on the use of personal and real guarantees. The first two 
columns show results when personal guarantees are the dependent variable 
(1/0), whereas columns 4 to 5 contain results for real guarantees. Columns 1 
and 4 exclude the loan characteristics, as they could potentially be jointly 
determined with the use of guarantees (and hence would therefore be “bad” 
controls).16 However, results confirm that their inclusion does not change 
the results. For this reason, we include loan characteristics in the remaining 
specifications. Columns 3 and 6 report the economic impact of each variable 
on the use of personal and real guarantees, respectively. The economic 
impact is obtained as the product of one standard deviation in the 
corresponding explanatory variable times its estimated coefficient relative 
to the unconditional mean of the dependent variable. 
16 Brick and Palia (2007) and other authors propose a simultaneous determination between 
collateral and loan interest rates. Recently, Mosk (2014) has shown that collateral decisions 
are prior to both interest and non-interest rate decisions in loan contracts. Our study also 
controls for variables such as borrower risk and loan characteristics that are important in 
setting interest rates. 
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Table 4 shows that the coefficients on loan maturity are positive and 
significant for both personal and real guarantees. However, it is larger in 
statistical and, especially, in economic terms in the case of real collateral, 
supporting the idea that as loans become longer-term, e.g., mortgages, the 
bank relies more on tangible real assets than in more uncertain personal 
guarantees. We also document that the effect of the loan size on the 
likelihood of posting guarantees is statistically significant at 5% level only 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES
Personal 
Guarantees 
(0/1)
Personal 
Guarantees 
(0/1)
Econ. Imp / 
Mean (%)
Real 
Guarantees 
(0/1)
Real 
Guarantees 
(0/1)
Econ. Imp / 
Mean (%)
Total Assets (log eur) -0.060*** -0.057*** -19.425 0.000 0.001 0.753
[0.004] [0.005] [0.001] [0.001]
Leverage 0.001*** 0.001*** 4.189 0.000*** 0.000*** 8.030
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
ROA (%) 0.000 0.000 0.358 -0.001*** -0.001*** -8.363
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Refinancing (0/1) 0.056*** 0.055*** 6.609 0.069*** 0.069*** 36.317
[0.012] [0.012] [0.004] [0.004]
Any Other Type of Contract (0/1) -0.034*** -0.008 -1.072 -0.040*** -0.001 -0.594
[0.006] [0.006] [0.003] [0.003]
Branch-Headquarter Distance (log km) 0.009*** 0.007** 3.086 0.009*** 0.005*** 11.000
[0.003] [0.003] [0.001] [0.001]
Loan Maturity (log months) 0.058*** 18.911 0.077*** 110.024
[0.002] [0.001]
Loan Size (log) 0.008* 3.614 0.022*** 42.214
[0.005] [0.001]
YES YES YES YES
YES YES YES YES
YES YES YES YES
YES YES YES YES
Observations 477,208 477,208 477,208 477,208
R-squared 0.319 0.336 0.154 0.265
This table provides evidence on the effect of bank, loan, bank-firm and firm characteristics on the use of personal
and real guarantees. The dependent variable in columns (1)-(2) is a variable that equals 1 if the loan has a
personal guarantee and 0 otherwise. In columns (4)-(5) the dependent variable is a dummy that equals 1 if the
loan has real guarantee and 0 otherwise. Columns (1) and (3) report the results obtained from the estimation of
equation (1) without loan characteristics while columns (2) and (5) contain the results obtained from the full
specification and represent the baseline specifications. Finally, columns (3) and (6) report the economic impact of
the baseline specification in percentage points, which is obtained as the product of one standard deviation in the
corresponding explanatory variable times its estimated coefficient relative to the unconditional mean of the
dependent variable. All regressions include sector, bank, year and province fixed effects. The standard errors are
clustered at firm level and given in parentheses. ***, **, and * denotes statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level, respectively.
Table 4: Determinants of the use of personal and real guarantees
Province FE
Bank Characteristic
Loan Characteristics
Bank-Firm Characteristic
Firm Characteristics
Sector FE
Bank FE
Year FE
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in the case of real guarantees. Thus, in the presence of large loans, the bank 
prefers to request real collateral to seize the real assets in case of default. 
Similar conclusions can be obtained from Table 5, which has a structure 
analogous to Table 4 but relies on the coverage ratio (guarantee value 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES
Personal 
Guarantees 
Coverage 
(%)
Personal 
Guarantees 
Coverage 
(%)
Econ. Imp 
/ Mean (%)
Real 
Guarantees 
Coverage 
(%)
Real 
Guarantees 
Coverage 
(%)
Econ. Imp 
/ Mean (%)
Total Assets (log eur) -10.084*** -9.609*** -20.358 0.083 0.221** 3.390
[0.625] [0.755] [0.126] [0.113]
Leverage 0.082*** 0.082*** 3.457 0.025*** 0.026*** 7.918
[0.019] [0.019] [0.006] [0.005]
ROA (%) 0.073 0.076 1.083 -0.086*** -0.079*** -8.202
[0.058] [0.058] [0.019] [0.018]
Refinancing (0/1) 11.365*** 11.212*** 8.314 6.985*** 6.999*** 37.588
[2.191] [2.152] [0.451] [0.398]
Any Other Type of Contract (0/1) 0.780 1.375 1.190 -3.879*** -0.158 -0.990
[1.316] [1.318] [0.324] [0.312]
Branch-Headquarter Distance (log km) 1.156** 1.079* 3.162 0.835*** 0.497*** 10.559
[0.573] [0.575] [0.155] [0.129]
Loan Maturity (log months) 2.104*** 4.235 7.662*** 111.698
[0.436] [0.125]
Loan Size (log) -0.770 -2.120 1.840*** 36.696
[0.642] [0.108]
YES YES YES YES
YES YES YES YES
YES YES YES YES
YES YES YES YES
Observations 477,208 477,208 477,208 477,208
R-squared 0.336 0.337 0.150 0.254
Province FE
Year FE
Bank FE
Sector FE
Firm Characteristics
This table provides evidence on the effect of bank, loan, bank-firm and firm characteristics on the coverage
ratio of real and personal guarantees. The dependent variable in columns (1)-(2) is the coverage of
personal guarantees, relative to the loan size. In columns (4)-(5) the dependent variable is the coverage of
real guarantees, relative to the loan size. Columns (1) and (3) report the results obtained from the
estimation of equation (1) without loan characteristics while columns (2) and (5) contain the results
obtained from the full specification and represent the baseline specifications. Finally, columns (3) and (6)
report the economic impact of the baseline specification in percentage points, which is obtained as the
product of one standard deviation in the corresponding explanatory variable times its estimated
coefficient relative to the unconditional mean of the dependent variable. All regressions include sector,
bank, year and province fixed effects. The standard errors are clustered at firm level and given in
parentheses. ***, **, and * denotes statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Table 5: Determinants of the coverage of personal and real guarantees
Bank Characteristic
Loan Characteristics
Bank-Firm Characteristic
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guarantees, whereas it is positive for real guarantees. This implies that in 
the case of personal guarantees, the bank tends to require higher coverage 
ratios to small firms. In contrast, in terms of real guarantees, smaller firms 
are required lower coverage ratios. This is consistent with the results in 
Ang, Lin and Tyler (1995), who find that small business owners often pledge 
personal assets and wealth in business loans. 
Another dimension determining the use of guarantees is relationship 
lending. The existence of a bank-firm relationship would in principle imply 
less asymmetric information and hence, less collateral (see theoretical 
studies by Boot and Thakor, 1994, and empirical work by Berger and Udell, 
1995, Degryse and Van Cayseele, 2000, and Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, 
Srinivasan, 2011, among others). When the loan information is not included 
in the regression (i.e., columns 1 and 4 of Table 4), we document a negative 
and significant effect of our relationship lending proxy, which is the 
existence of other bank-firm contracts, for both types of guarantees. 
The moral hazard literature documents that when lenders can observe a 
borrower’s credit quality, low/high quality borrowers obtain loans 
with/without collateral (Boot, Thakor, and Udell, 1991; Berger and Udell, 
1990 and 1995; and Jiménez, Salas, and Saurina, 2006). In line with this 
theory, we document in Tables 4 and 5 that overall, firm characteristics 
suggesting higher creditworthiness imply lower guarantees requirements. 
There are two exceptions, as higher firm size only impacts on personal 
guarantees, whereas higher profitability only reduces real guarantees. 
Table 5 shows one difference with respect to the impact of firm related 
variables on coverage ratios, since different signs are obtained for the effect 
of total assets across types of guarantees: It is negative for personal 
divided by loan size) instead of the use (or not) of a particular type of 
guarantee.17 
                                                            
17 The coefficients in columns (4) and (5) of Table 5 are around a hundred times higher than 
those of columns (4) and (5) of Table 4, which rely on the discrete dependent variable. This 
indicates that the real guarantees in the form of mortgages cover, on average, around 100 
percent of the loan size as it is shown in Panel B of Table 2. 
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However, when loan characteristics are included, the effect of relation 
lending turns out to be non-significant in both cases. Similar results are 
obtained in Table 5. 
Tables 4 and 5 unambiguously show that a higher organizational distance 
increases the likelihood of pledging both personal and real guarantees.18 
This finding is line with Meles, Sampagnaro and Starita (2013), who 
document that distant branches – those with more difficulties to obtain soft 
information and site-specific information from headquarters – are more 
likely to require collateral than local ones. However, these results do not 
support the lender-based view of Inderst and Mueller (2007). According to 
this perspective, local banks (i.e., banks with short organizational distance) 
attract local borrowers. Local banks have superior information but they 
cannot use this information to set local borrower loan’s interest rates 
because of competition constraint and the existence of an outside option (i.e., 
                                                            
18 Similar results are obtained using minutes instead of kilometers to measure the distance. 
the borrower can go to a distant lender). To overcome these constraints, 
local banks require collateral to exploit their informational advantages. In 
addition, our results also challenge Berger and Udell (2002), who argue that 
the larger the organizational distance, the more likely the loan is processed 
using transactional lending technologies. According to their view, 
transactional lending implies that loans are granted to safe and highly 
transparent borrowers, which are less likely to be collateralized. In contrast, 
our findings support the idea that the organizational distance favors the use 
of collateral. 
Although not reported in Tables 4 and 5, the magnitude of the year fixed-
effects coefficients can help us understand the use of personal and real 
guarantees over the sample period. These coefficients reflect the effects of 
economic variables that are common to all the firms and loans granted over 
the sample period. Figure 4 depicts the coefficients for the year effects 
estimated from equation (1) using as dependent variables dummies that 
denote the existence of personal and real guarantees in a given loan. We 
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observe that there is a sharp increase in the magnitude of the coefficients 
corresponding to the personal guarantees after 2011. This effect could be 
due to the Spanish economic and financial crisis, but also to the 
requirements of European banks to improve the capital ratio – we further 
elaborate on this point in the next section.19  
As a formal test of Hypothesis 1, we examine the differential effects of each 
explanatory variable on the use and coverage of both personal and real 
guarantees. For that aim, we first fit two different models separately on the 
same data, one based on personal guarantees and the other on real 
                                                            
19 Around 13,500 loans in our sample include both personal and real guarantees. We 
examine in the Internet Appendix whether this duplicity of guarantees affect to our results. 
We find that the results are basically unchanged when we account for the use of both types 
of guarantees. In addition we observe that when the loan has a personal (real) guarantee 
there is a significantly lower probability of additionally having a real (personal) guarantee. 
Thus, although some loans have the two types of guarantees, they are really substitutes. 
Figure 4: Year fixed effects
Figure 4 shows the year fixed effects estimated from equation (1) using as dependent
variables dummy variables that denotes the existence of personal (solid line) and real
(dashed line) guarantees in a given loan.
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guarantees. We store the estimation results and we then estimate the 
simultaneous covariance of the coefficients (i.e., cross-model covariances) to 
test the cross-coefficients hypothesis that the common coefficients are equal. 
If this is the case, they would exhibit similar effects on personal and real 
guarantees. Columns (1) and (2) in Table 6 show the results of these tests. 
Table 6 reveals significant differential effects of loan maturity, confirming 
that real collateral is increasingly prevalent at longer maturities. The loan 
size and total assets tests are negative and significant, confirming that the 
bank prefers to require real instead of personal guarantees to large firms 
and for large loans. This may reveal larger uncertainty about the firm’s 
owners/managers ability to pay back the loan when this is large. Table 6 
also shows that personal guarantees are more frequently used in more 
leveraged firms, suggesting that the bank tends to use personal guarantees 
as the firm creditworthiness worsens. 
Table 7 shows the percentage of the R-squared explained by each group of 
variables associated with results reported in Table 4 (first and second 
columns) and Table 5 (third and fourth columns). The first (second) and 
third (fourth) columns refer to the explanatory power of each group of 
drivers on personal (real) guarantees and their coverage ratio, respectively. 
The most important group of variables explaining personal guarantees are 
the year fixed-effects (63.46 and 80.75 percent, for guarantee dummies and 
coverage ratios, respectively), that proxy for overall economic conditions. 
Relevant second order effects are firm and loan characteristics, together 
with the bank dummies. The results are very different for real guarantees. 
In this case, loan characteristics exhibit a crucial role (58.14 and 57.11 
percent, for guarantee dummies and coverage ratios, respectively), followed 
by the sector dummies (23.60 and 23.98 percent, respectively). In particular, 
the construction sector is the one where the use of real guarantees is 
preferred to a higher extent. The prevalent role of loan characteristics for 
the use of real guarantees is due to the fact that most of the long-maturity / 
large-size loans require real guarantees. 
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(1) (2)
Guarantees (0/1) Coverage
VARIABLES
b[Personal] - b[Real] b[Personal] - b[Real] 
Total Assets (log eur) -0.057***           -9.83***               
  [0.005]  [0.758]
Leverage 0.000**          0.056***            
  [0.000]   [0.020]
ROA (%) 0.001***            0.155***              
 [0.000]  [0.056]
Refinancing (0/1) -0.014              4.214*                
  [0.013]   [2.215]
Any Other Type of Contract (0/1) -0.007               1.533
  [0.007]  [1.363]
Branch-Headquarter Distance (log km) 0.001 0.582
 [0.003]     [0.581]
Loan Maturity (log months) -0.019***          -5.558***            
 [0.003]   [0.471]
Loan Size (log) -0.014***           -2.609***             
 [0.004] [0.636]
YES YES
YES YES
YES YES
YES YES
Sector FE
Bank FE
Year FE
Province FE
Table 6: Differential effects of the determinants of the use and coverage of 
personal and real guarantees
This table provides evidence on the differential effects of several groups of variables on the use and
coverage of personal and real guarantees. To analyze the differential effects of the variables we first
fit two different models separately on the same data, one based on personal and the other on real
guarantees. We store the estimation results and then, we estimate the simultaneous covariance of
the coefficients of the two previous models (i.e., cross-model covariances) to test the cross-coefficients
hypothesis that the common coefficients are equal and so, exhibit similar effects on personal and real
guarantees. Thus, our aim is to compare the differential effects of different drivers of the use and
coverage of guarantees on the two types of guarantees. As the two estimations rely on the same
estimation sample, the standard errors obtained from the simultaneous estimation are identical to
those obtained for each individual regression. Column (1) contains the results of tests for cross-model
hypotheses based on linear combinations of cross-model coefficients obtained when the use of
personal and real guarantees are regressed on the same explanatory variables. The results contained
in column (2) correspond to the case in which we use the coverage ratio of personal and real
guarantees. The standard errors are clustered at firm level and given in parentheses. ***, **, and *
denotes statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Bank Characteristic
Loan Characteristics
Bank-Firm Characteristic
Firm Characteristics
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In sum, our results support Hypothesis 1 due to the significant differential 
effects of loan characteristics (size and maturity), the firm credit quality, 
and economic conditions on real and personal guarantee usage. Given the 
contrasting effect attributable to economic conditions and the extensive use 
of personal guarantees after 2011 (see Figure 1), we investigate in Section 5 
the bank guarantee policy change that occurred in the last quarter of 2011. 
In turn, Section 6 analyzes the effects of guarantees on firm risk and 
performance for the period before and after the personal guarantees became 
widely required. 
5. Use of Real and Personal Guarantees around October 2011 
Figure 2 reveals a notorious change of strategy with regard to the 
requirements of guarantees in October 2011. This is the outcome of a 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Personal 
Guarantees 
(0/1)
Real 
Guarantees 
(0/1)
Personal 
Guarantees 
Coverage 
(%)
Real 
Guarantees 
Coverage 
(%)
Total Assets (log eur)
Leverage
ROA (%)
Refinancing (0/1)
Any Other Type of Contract (0/1) 3.86 2.95 2.53 2.90
Bank Characteristic
Branch-Headquarter Distance (log km) 0.06 0.23 0.05 0.22
Loan Maturity (log months)
Loan Size (log)
2.78 23.60 0.70 23.98
9.35 1.35 6.57 1.30
63.46 1.32 80.75 1.44
4.60 5.89 3.10 6.09
This table contains the percentage of the R-squared explained by each group of variables
employed in the regressions whose results are reported in Tables 4 and 5. Concretely, column
(1) represents the percentage of the R-squared explained by bank, loan, bank-firm and firm
characteristics, and sector, bank, year and province dummy variables according to the results
obtained in column (2) of Table 4. Column (2) corresponds to the R-squared obtained in column
(5) of Table 4. Finally, columns (3) and (4) correspond to the R-squared obtained in columns (2)
and (5) of Table 5, respectively.
Table 7: Percentage of R-squared explained by each group of variables
0.85 57.11
5.46 6.96
58.14
6.52
8.30
Loan Characteristics
Bank-Firm Characteristic
Firm Characteristics
Sectoral Dummies
7.58
Bank Dummies
Year Dummies
Province Dummies
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variables with the exception of the year fixed effects.20 In addition, we add 
to the specification a proxy for the overall economic risk, as measured by the 
5-year sovereign CDS spread. We include a dummy called policy change that 
takes the value one after October 2011, and equals zero otherwise. Results 
are shown in Table 8, with the use of guarantees and coverage ratios as 
dependent variables. The table also shows the differences across coefficients 
(personal v/s real guarantees) and a test in which the null hypothesis states 
that both coefficients are the same. 
combination of two events: i) the recommendations and measures following 
the July 2011 stress test results in an environment of weak economic 
conditions; and ii) the EU agreement for which European banks should 
increase their capital buffers.  
We next analyze in detail the implications of this new strategy on the usage 
of guarantees following October 2011. Given the needs for capital and the 
improvement of loan portfolios’ credit risk, banks would tend to require 
more guarantees in loan contracts in order to hedge against potential losses 
derived by loan defaults and to align the interest of creditors and debtors 
mitigating default rates. Indeed, efficient personal guarantees (i.e., personal 
guarantees that satisfy certain conditions) and real guarantees can be used 
to reduce RWA, and thus, to improve regulatory capital requirements. To 
further understand this shift in the bank policy concerning guarantees, we 
perform the following experiment. We estimate equation (1) using a 3-month 
window before and after the October 2011 on the same set of explanatory 
                                                            
20 We have repeated the estimation of equation (1) for the pre-October 2011 period to 
discard that the results in Table 4 are driven by the policy event. We find that these new 
results are consistent with those reported in Table 4. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES
Personal 
Guarantees 
(0/1)
Real 
Guarantees 
(0/1)
b[Personal] -
b[Real] 
Guarantees 
(0/1)
Personal 
Guarantees 
Coverage 
(%)
Real 
Guarantees 
Coverage 
(%)
b[Personal] -
b[Real] 
Coverage
Policy Change (0/1) 0.429*** 0.033*** 0.396*** 66.892*** 3.269*** 63.623***
[0.013] [0.005] [0.014] [2.127] [0.519] [2.173]
Total Assets (log eur) -0.061*** 0.001 -0.062*** -9.393*** 0.294 -9.686***
[0.007] [0.002] [0.007] [1.009] [0.238] [1.033]
Leverage 0.000** 0.000 0.000 0.080** 0.012 0.068***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.038] [0.009] [0.039]
ROA (%) 0.000 -0.001*** 0.001** 0.172* -0.071*** 0.243**
[0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.102] [0.027] [0.104]
Refinancing (0/1) 0.034*** 0.056*** -0.021 2.673 5.694*** -3.020
[0.012] [0.006] [0.014] [1.933] [0.631] [2.075]
Any Other Type of Contract (0/1) -0.002 -0.011* 0.009 -3.598* -1.104 -2.494
[0.012] [0.007] [0.014] [2.025] [0.673] [2.159]
Branch-Headquarter Distance (log km) 0.011** 0.009*** 0.002 1.080 0.775*** 0.304
[0.005] [0.002] [0.006] [0.917] [0.231] [0.928]
Loan Maturity (log months) 0.060*** 0.075*** -0.015** 2.585*** 7.345*** -4.760***
[0.005] [0.003] [0.006] [0.812] [0.328] [0.901]
Loan Size (log) 0.003 0.016*** -0.013** -0.880 1.263*** -2.143***
[0.005] [0.002] [0.005] [0.729] [0.207] [0.747]
Sovereign CDS 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.017 -0.004 0.022
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.020] [0.004] [0.021]
YES YES YES YES
YES YES YES YES
YES YES YES YES
Observations 28,994 28,994 28,994 28,994
R-squared 0.341 0.232 0.273 0.214
Table 8: Bank guantee policy change
This table analyzes how banks modify their guarantee policy in order to improve their loan’s credit risk and
capital ratios around October 2011. We estimate equation (1) using a 3-month window before and after the
bank policy change on the same set of explanatory variables as in equation (1) with the exception of the year
fixed effects. Additionally, we add to the specification a proxy for risk of the whole economy measured from the
5-year sovereign CDS spread. We include a dummy called policy change that equals 1 after October, 2011, and
equals 0 otherwise. Columns (1) and (2) report the results obtained when the dependent variables are the use of
personal and real guarantees, respectively. Columns (4) and (5) contain the results obtained when the
dependent variables are the coverage of personal and real guarantees relative to the loan size, respectively.
Columns (3) and (6) contain the difference of common coefficients obtained in columns (1)-(2) and (4)-(5),
respectively, and a test in which the null hypothesis states that both coefficients have similar effects on the
corresponding dependent variables based on the same methodology used in Table 6. The standard errors are
clustered at firm level and given in parentheses. ***, **, and * denotes statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and
10% level, respectively.
Bank FE
Province FE
Bank Characteristic
Loan Characteristics
Bank-Firm Characteristic
Firm Characteristics
Sector FE
Bank Guarantee Policy Change
Sovereign Risk
Columns (1) and (2) in Table 8 show that the use of personal and real 
guarantees is significantly more widespread after the bank guarantee policy 
change, with personal guarantees increasing substantially more (column 
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(3)). This is also the case for coverage ratios, as shown in columns (4) to (6). 
The control variables produce the same qualitative results as those in 
Tables 4 and 5 except that the loan size for personal guarantees and 
leverage for real guarantees are no longer significant. 
In Table 9 we show the percentage of R-squared explained by each set of 
variables in the regressions shown in Table 8. Half of the variation in both 
the use and coverage ratio of personal guarantees is explained by the policy 
change. Bank dummies explain around 20 percent, firm characteristics 
explain around 8 percent and the CDS spread explains almost 8 percent. 
Results for real guarantees stand in stark contrast, as the policy change 
only explains around 3 percent. Again, loan characteristics explain most of 
the variations in real guarantees and the associated coverage ratios (more 
than 54 percent), with the sectorial dummies explaining around 20 percent 
and the province dummies more than 9 percent. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Personal 
Guarantees 
(0/1)
Real 
Guarantees 
(0/1)
Personal 
Guarantees 
Coverage 
(%)
Real 
Guarantees 
Coverage 
(%)
Policy Change 50.97 3.14 53.35 3.22
Total Assets (log eur)
Leverage (%)
ROA (%)
Refinancing (0/1)
Any Other Type of Contract (0/1) 0.80 3.18 0.94 3.31
Bank Characteristic
Branch-Headquarter Distance (log km) 0.29 0.33 0.27 0.28
Loan Maturity (log months)
Loan Size (log)
Sovereign CDS 7.87 0.48 7.83 0.36
2.28 20.39 2.92 19.28
21.66 2.81 20.47 2.75
3.99 9.23 5.23 9.98
Bank Dummies
Province Dummies
Bank-Firm Characteristic
Firm Characteristics
7.66
Sectoral Dummies
Sovereign Risk
1.08 54.52
Table 9: Percentage of R-squared explained by each group of variables 
around the bank guantee policy change
This table contains the percentage of the R-squared explained by each group of variables
employed in the regressions whose results are reported in Table 8. Concretely, column (1)
represents the percentage of the R-squared explained by the bank policy change, distance,
loan characteristics, relationship lending, firm characteristics, sovereign risk, and
industry, bank, year and province dummies variables according to the results obtained in
column (1) of Table 8. Column (2) corresponds to the R-squared obtained in column (2) of
Table 8. Finally, columns (3) and (4) correspond to the R-squared obtained in columns (4)
and 5 of Table 8, respectively.
Bank Guarantee Policy Change
Loan Characteristics
4.50 54.57
5.87 7.90 6.29
Our results are in agreement with Hypothesis 2 and speak clearly about the 
change in the strategy of guarantees requirements to help improve the 
loan’s credit risk and regulatory capital requirements. The bank reacted by 
increasing both types of guarantees but the use of personal guarantees 
became substantially more prevalent. Indeed, Figure 5 shows that the shift 
towards personal guarantees did not come from a change in the average 
maturity or in the average loan size given that they were comparable in 
those terms. Despite the potential limitations of personal guarantees to 
reduce RWA (i.e., personal guarantees should satisfy strict requirements to 
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One may argue that if the bank uses guarantees to improve its regulatory 
capital, better capitalized subsidiaries should require guarantees less 
frequently. We take advantage of the information relative to the specific 
subsidiary granting the loan to conduct a formal test on this issue. For that 
aim, we perform a regression analysis similar to the one whose results are 
reported in Table 8 but including a dummy that is equal to one if the total 
capital ratio on unconsolidated basis is above the median across the bank 
and its subsidiaries, and its interaction with the policy change dummy.21 
Figure 5: Maturity and size around October 2011
The top panel shows the average loan maturity using a 3-month window before and
after October 2011. The bottom panel shows the average loan size using a 3-month
window before and after October 2011.
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be considered effective and consequently not necessarily all personal 
guarantees can be used to reduce RWA), the more rapid and efficient 
collateral execution of the personal guarantees jointly with higher coverage 
ratios and the lack of real assets to be used as collateral; could justify their 
extended use. 
                                                            
21 The bank/subsidiary fixed effects used in the baseline regression are excluded from this 
specification 
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lower capital ratios. The linear combination of the coefficients associated to 
the dummy denoting the policy change and its interaction with the dummy 
that is equal to one for better capitalized subsidiaries, is positive and 
statistically significant. Thus, the use of personal guarantees after the 
policy change was common to all the subsidiaries but those with worse 
capital ratios required this type of guarantees to a much higher extent. The 
goal of worse capitalized subsidiaries to improve capital ratios through an 
extensive use of efficient personal guarantees is supported by Figure 3, 
which shows an increase in the average coverage ratio of personal 
guarantees after the guarantee policy change.  
Results, reported in Table 10, show that the better is the capital position of 
the credit institution, the lower is the use of both real and personal 
guarantees. The lower use of guarantees by better capitalized subsidiaries is 
even more evident in the case of personal guarantees after October 2011, 
confirming the idea that the policy change affected those subsidiaries with 
One potential concern one may have about these findings is the presence of 
potentially confounding events. Indeed on October 26, 2011, the ECB 
allotted 56,934 millions of Euros to the banking system through its 1-year 
LTRO facility. This operation was announced on October 6, 2011 joint with 
another operation for December 21, 2011 that was finally substituted by the 
3-year LTRO. This timing coincides with our previously analyzed policy 
change and given that the LTRO could have influenced the supply of loans 
and their characteristics, we need to show that the increase in the use of 
guarantees is not due to the implementation of this non-standard measure. 
We do so by relying on the first implementation of the LTRO facility in 
2009. Concretely, on May 2009, the ECB announced three 1-year LTRO 
facilities that would come into effect on June 24, September 30, and 
December 15, 2009. To discard the possibility that previous results are 
influenced by the implementation of the LTRO facility, we analyze if there 
is a significant variation in the bank guarantee policy around the first 
announcement of the LTRO in 2009. The results, available in the Internet 
Appendix, show that the probability of requiring personal guarantees 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES
Personal 
Guarantees 
(0/1)
Real 
Guarantees 
(0/1)
b[Personal] -
b[Real] 
Guarantees 
(0/1)
Personal 
Guarantees 
Coverage 
(%)
Real 
Guarantees 
Coverage 
(%)
b[Personal] -
b[Real] 
Coverage
Bank Policy Change 
Policy Change (0/1) 0.472*** 0.032*** 0.441*** 74.185*** 3.149*** 71.036***
[0.013] [0.006] [0.014] [2.193] [0.583] [2.263]
Total Capital Ratio Above Median (0/1) -0.069*** -0.034*** -0.035*** -6.449*** -3.264*** -3.184
[0.013] [0.006] [-0.035] [1.864] [0.570] [-3.184]
Total Capital Ratio Above Median x Policy Change (0/1) -0.402*** 0.002 -0.404*** -65.276*** 0.229 -65.506***
[0.022] [0.009] [0.024] [3.600] [0.933] [3.746]
Total Assets (log eur) -0.067*** 0.001 -0.068*** -10.237*** 0.297 -10.534***
[0.006] [0.002] [0.007] [0.954] [0.235] [0.986]
Leverage 0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.075* 0.011 0.064
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.039] [0.009] [0.041]
ROA (%) 0.001 -0.001*** 0.001** 0.192* -0.070** 0.263**
[0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.103] [0.027] [0.105]
Refinancing (0/1) 0.032** 0.055*** -0.024 2.289 5.628*** -3.338
[0.012] [0.006] [0.014] [1.962] [0.633] [2.095]
Any Other Type of Contract (0/1) 0.000 -0.010 0.010 -3.290 -1.047 -2.244
[0.012] [0.006] [0.014] [2.045] [0.671] [2.172]
Branch-Headquarter Distance (log km) -0.008 0.008*** -0.016*** -1.640* 0.665*** -2.305**
[0.005] [0.002] [0.006] [0.875] [0.225] [0.905]
Loan Maturity (log months) 0.058*** 0.074*** -0.016** 2.309*** 7.259*** -4.950***
[0.005] [0.003] [0.006] [0.782] [0.323] [0.873]
Loan Size (log) 0.004 0.016*** -0.012** -0.735 1.251*** -1.986***
[0.004] [0.002] [0.005] [0.702] [0.206] [0.725]
Sovereign CDS 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.006 -0.005 0.010
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.020] [0.004] [0.021]
YES YES YES YES
NO NO NO NO
YES YES YES YES
Observations 28,994 28,994 28,994 28,994
R-squared 0.335 0.231 0.273 0.213
Sector FE
Bank FE
Province FE
Table 10: Bank guantee policy change and regulatory capital needs
This table analyzes how banks modify their guarantee policy in order to improve their loan’s credit risk and capital ratios
around October 2011 depending on their capital position. The novelty with respect to Table 8 is the use of the dummy variable
“Total Capital Ratio Above Median” and its interaction with the variable “Policy Shock” as two additional explanatory
variables. “Total Capital Ratio Above Median” is equal to one if the total capital ratio on unconsolidated basis is above the
median across the bank and its subsidiaries and zero otherwise. Columns (1) and (2) report the results obtained when the
dependent variables are the use of personal and real guarantees, respectively. Columns (4) and (5) contain the results
obtained when the dependent variables are the coverage of personal and real guarantees relative to the loan size, respectively.
Columns (3) and (6) contain the difference of common coefficients obtained in columns (1)-(2) and (4)-(5), respectively, and a
test in which the null hypothesis states that both coefficients have similar effects on the corresponding dependent variables
based on the same methodology used in Table 6. The standard errors are clustered at firm level and given in parentheses. ***,
**, and * denotes statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Bank Characteristic
Loan Characteristics
Bank-Firm Characteristic
Firm Characteristics
Sovereign Risk
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6. The Use of Guarantees and Firm Risk Taking 
In this section we analyze whether guarantees contribute to discipline 
borrowers leading to lower default rates thereby enhancing firm 
profitability. 
6.1. Empirical methodology 
Firm risk is measured by means of a dummy variable that takes the value of 
one in case a firm’s loan defaults a year after the first time the firm pledged 
guarantees, conditioned on not having defaulted prior to that event. We 
require guarantees to cover every single day during the three years 
following the guarantee pledge. Otherwise, we drop these loans/firms from 
our analysis. 
Those individual firms that pledged guarantees for the first time in a given 
loan contract (treatment group) are then matched to a control group. This 
group consists of firms in the same industry, with similar size and 
profitability that got the loan the same year as the corresponding firm in the 
treatment group but did not pledge guarantees after the granting of the loan 
and did not pledge guarantees in the prior three years. We form buckets 
along the year, size, profitability, and industry dimensions in order match 
firms according to these variables. We consider three size buckets following 
the European Commission classification.22 The three size buckets include 
micro and small firms (less than €10 million of total assets), medium-sized 
(total assets between €10 and €43), and large firms (more than €43 million 
of total assets). The three profitability buckets correspond to the three 
actually diminishes after the announcement of the 1-year LTRO. It confirms 
that the results obtained in the previous analysis cannot be attributed to the 
coincident announcement of the LTRO facility. 
                                                            
22 The following link contains the SMEs definition, according to the European Commission, 
based among other characteristics, on the amount of total assets: 
http://ec.europa.eu/growth/smes/business-friendly-environment/sme-
definition/index_en.htm 
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corresponding control group is then regressed on a constant variable. We 
perform two regression analyses for the two types of guarantees using two 
different time periods corresponding to the year in which the loans were 
granted: 2006-2010 and 2012-2013. The coefficients obtained in this 
regression analysis represent the probability of a loan default for those 
firms that pledged guarantees (treatment group) for the first time (i.e., we 
exclude latter uses of guarantees) in excess of the average probability of 
default of the corresponding control group.23 
We perform a similar analysis to study the effect of guarantees 
requirements on firm performance. The dependent variable in the new 
analysis is the firm’s ROA a year after the firm pledged guarantees for the 
first time in excess of the ROA of the control group. The control group 
consists of firms in the same industry with similar size, profitability, and 
risk profile that got the loan the same year as the corresponding firm in the 
treatment group but did not have guarantees after the granting of the loan. 
The firm risk is proxied by a dummy indicating whether the firm has been 
refinanced before the loan is granted. As in the case of the risk indicator, we 
form buckets along the previous dimensions and regress the firm excess 
ROA on a constant variable. 
6.2. Results 
As shown in the previous section, in October 2011 there is a bank guarantee 
policy change that causes an increase in the use of real collateral and, 
especially, personal guarantees. To assess the differential impact on firm 
risk and performance around this episode, we compare the risk profile and 
performance of the firms that secured their loans with guarantees for the 
first time before 2011 with those that secured their loans during 2012 and 
onwards. 
terciles implied by the distribution of the variable. Industry buckets are also 
used to classify firms. Finally, we organize the firms in a total of 940 
buckets for all potential combinations of the four previous dimensions. The 
indicator of default for each firm in excess of the average indicator in the 
                                                            
23 Standard errors of the corresponding regressions are clustered at the bucket level. 
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4)) guarantees in excess of the average risk of the corresponding control 
group. Table 12 contains a similar analysis but based on firm performance 
instead of risk. 
We observe that for the loans granted during the period 2006-2010, personal 
guarantees (column 1 of Table 11) led to a significant reduction in firm risk 
whereas the effect of real guarantees (column 3) is not statistically different 
from zero, consistently with the statement made in Hypothesis 3. In fact, 
the economic effect, obtained as the estimated coefficient for the treatment 
group relative to the average default probability of the treatment group 
before the event, is sizeable in the case of personal guarantees, i.e., -9.5%. 
This effect could be explained by the transformation in the nature of the 
firm responsibility in the presence of personal guarantees. The positive 
effect that personal guarantees exert on the loan default is not translated 
into a worse firm performance (see column 1 in Table 12). 
Table 11 shows the results of the experiment determining potential changes 
in firms’ risk after the use of personal (columns (1-2)) and real (columns (3-
However, in the analysis based on loans granted from 2012 and onwards, 
personal guarantees (column 2) do not exert a significant contribution to 
diminish risk-taking. The extensive use of personal guarantees in the 
second sub-period might have led to less selective decisions on the firms 
pledging guarantees given that they were used for regulatory purposes to 
improve capital ratios. Given that the requirements were not necessarily 
directed to discipline borrowers limiting their risk taking, the pledging of 
personal guarantees could have had a negligible effect on their posterior 
default risk. This and the high coverage ratios associated to this type of 
guarantees (see Figure 3); could have induced some borrowers to reduce 
even more their risk appetite, ultimately worsening their performance as 
shown in column (2) of Table 12. 
According to our results, the use of personal guarantees before 2011 helped 
disciplining firms without damaging their performance but this positive 
effect vanished after the extensive usage of guarantees following October 
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Personal          
(2006-2010)
Personal          
(2012-2014)
Real              
(2006-2010)
Real              
(2012-2014)
Treatment Effect -0.024** 0.001 0.028 0.048
[0.010] [0.015] [0.020] [0.030]
Observations 4,967 2,462 1,334 228
Table 11: Guarantees and firm risk taking
This table shows evidence on the firm risk taking after the use of personal and real guarantees for the first
time. Risk-taking is measured by means of a dummy variable that takes value one in case any firm loan
defaults a year after the first time when the firm pledged guarantees, conditioned on not having defaulted
prior to that event. We require that guarantees cover every single day during the three years following the
guarantee setting. The treatment group consists of firms that pledged guarantees by the first time in the
form of personal (columns (1-2)) or real (columns (3-4)) guarantees. The control group consists of firms in
the same industry and with similar size and profitability that got the loan without guarantees the same
year as the firm in the treatment group. The risk taking of each firm in excess of the average for the firms
in the corresponding control group is then regressed on a constant variable, which is the coefficient
reported in this table. Columns 1 and 3 report the results obtained for personal and real guarantees from
the loans granted between 2006 and 2010 while columns 2 and 4 report the corresponding results for the
two types of guarantees using the loans granted during the period 2012-2013. The standard errors of the
corresponding regressions are clustered at group-firm level, where each group corresponds to firms with
similar characteristics in terms of the previously mentioned dimensions. ***, **, and * denotes statistical
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Personal          
(2006-2010)
Personal          
(2012-2014)
Real              
(2006-2010)
Real              
(2012-2014)
Treatment Effect -0.003 -0.004* 0.005 -0.005
[0.002] [0.002] [0.003] [0.006]
Observations 9,971 4,782 3,149 464
Table 12: Guarantees and firm performance
This table shows evidence on the firm performance after the use of personal and real guarantees for the
first time. Performance is measured by means of the firm’s ROA a year after the firm pledged guarantees
by the first time in excess of the ROA of the control group. We require that guarantees cover every single
day during the three years following the guarantee setting. The treatment group consists of firms that
pledged guarantees by the first time in the form of personal (columns (1-2)) or real (columns (3-4))
guarantees. The control group consists of firms in the same industry with similar size, profitability, and
risk profile that got the loan the same year as the corresponding firm in the treatment group but did not
have guarantees after the granting of the loan. The firm performance in excess of the average performance
of the firms in the corresponding control group is then regressed on a constant variable, which is the
coefficient reported in this table. Columns 1 and 3 report the results obtained for personal and real
guarantees from the loans granted between 2006 and 2010 while columns 2 and 4 report the corresponding
results for the two types of guarantees using the loans granted during the period 2012-2013. The standard
errors of the corresponding regressions are clustered at group-firm level, where each group corresponds to
firms with similar characteristics in terms of the previously mentioned dimensions. ***, **, and * denotes
statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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2011. The strategy adopted after that date can be positive in terms of 
financial stability since the bank can hedge potential defaults and improve 
capital ratios. Nevertheless, the use of personal guarantees with a higher 
coverage ratio implies that the risk ultimately relies on firm managers and 
this could penalize the efficiency of their decisions and their current and 
future enterprises. This result highlights that guarantees can also have 
costs, which are associated to their overuse. 
7. Conclusions 
This is the first comprehensive paper dealing with the different 
determinants, usefulness, and effectiveness of personal versus real 
guarantees. Based on a unique dataset containing information on the 
different kinds of guarantees granted, we first uncover significant 
differences related to the drivers of personal versus real guarantees. The 
requirements of personal and real guarantees respond differently to loan 
and firm characteristics. In sum, personal guarantees are mostly driven by 
economic conditions, while real guarantees are mostly explained by loan 
characteristics. 
Secondly, we further investigate the economic conditions that affect 
differently the preference of each type of guarantee. Concretely, in view of 
Figures 1 and 2 we analyze the implications of the change in the bank 
guarantees policy in October 2011 that is the outcome of two events: i) the 
recommendations and measures following the July 2011 stress test results 
in an environment of weak economic conditions; and ii) the EU agreement 
for which European banks should increase their capital buffers. We 
document that both personal and real guarantees are used to improve loan’s 
credit risk and regulatory capital requirements, but personal guarantees 
were preferred to real guarantees in the specific context of our analysis. 
Thus, in spite of the potential limitations of the personal guarantees to 
reduce RWA (i.e., personal guarantees should satisfy strict requirements to 
be considered effective and so, not all personal guarantees can be used to 
reduce RWA), the more rapid and efficient collateral execution of the 
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personal guarantees jointly with higher coverage ratios and the lack of real 
assets to be used as collateral; could justify their extended use. 
Finally, we study the effect of guarantees’ requirements on the firm itself 
and document that personal guarantees led to a decline in firm risk before 
the widespread usage of this type of guarantees after October 2011. From a 
policy perspective, this would call for a more widespread use of personal 
guarantees in loan contracts in order to reduce excessive risk-taking on the 
side of firms. Interestingly, the October 2011 policy episode induced the 
bank to increase lending against personal guarantees with higher coverage 
ratios as a result. However, despite their effectiveness prior to 2011, their 
later overuse led to a higher cost in the form of lower profitability, probably 
due to their limiting effect on managers’ investments in forthcoming 
projects.   
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